Evolutionary prisoner's dilemma games with interactive diversity on adaptive networks

Interactive diversity games enable individuals to respond differently to different neighbors on a network, and they also better reflect the nature of reality. In this presentation, we intend to provide a method for transitioning from a well-known pairwise interacting game (node-based game, NB game) to a novel game rule with multiple strategies across neighbors (edge-based game, EB game). Initial networks in the newly generated game rule differentiate between EB and NB games. We conducted an in-depth analysis of a particular game and discovered that the EB game encourages cooperation; specifically, a small change in the initial condition has a significant effect on the level of cooperation. When a system lacks symmetry, such as under the EB game rule, we identify the limitation of pair approximations. We also analyze the temporal topological structure of the EB game using two types of assortativity and conclude that a tightly bound cooperative community is essential for maximizing the final level of cooperation.